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STATEMENT
I.
Was the
for appeal?

issue

raised

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

OF

by

THE

ISSUES

appellant

preserved

As a general rule,

at

trial

[Utah] appellate

courts will not consider an issue . . . raised for the first time
on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case
involves exceptional circumstances. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,
359 (Utah App. 1993).
II.
Has the
the evidence?

appellant

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

met

her

burden

of

marshaling

all

The defendant " ' ' must marshal all

evidence supporting the . . . verdict and must then show how this
marshaled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.' ' " State
v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381

(Utah 1992) (emphasis in original)

(citations omitted).
III.
Is proof of intent to obtain sexual gratification
stimulation a necessary element of the offense?
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW.

Where a claim

is asserted

or

without

argument in an appellant's brief, the appellate court may refuse
to consider the claim.

State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah

App. 1992) .
IV.
If
the phrase
"in an
act
of
apparent
sexual
stimulation or gratification" is not an element of intentf
was the evidence sufficient to satisfy that phrase as an
element of physical conduct under the ordinance?
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW.

Appellate

review

of

claims

of

insufficiency of the evidence based on a bench trial apply the
"clearly erroneous" standard.

State v. Featherstone, 781 P.2d

424, 431-32 (Utah 1989).
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V.
If the phrase is an element of intent, was the
evidence
sufficient
to
meet
the
"apparent
sexual
stimulation or gratification" element of the ordinance
STANDARD

OF

REVIEW.

Appellate

review

of

claims

of

insufficiency of the evidence based on a bench trial apply the
"clearly erroneous" standard.

State v. Featherstone, 781 P. 2d

424, 431-32 (Utah 1989) .

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Pursuant

BELOW

to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b),

the

plaintiff and appellee will not present an independent Statement
of the Case.
STATEMENT

OF THE

FACTS

In the evening hours of April 29, 1993, Officer Kent Bigelow
and Detective Arslanian of the Salt Lake City Police Department
were assigned to vice and were working in the areas of State
Street and North Temple, areas known to be heavily worked by
prostitutes.

R. 66-67.

Officer Bigelow and Detective Arslanian observed a female
known to them as having prior prostitution bookings get into a
silver vehicle at Harvard
Street. R.

67.

That

("defendant"). R. 67.

(approximately 1100 South) and State

female was

the defendant, Diane

Fritz

The officers attempted to follow the silver

vehicle containing the defendant, in an attempt to catch her in
the act of prostitution. R.67, 69.
so. R. 67.

The officers were unable to do

The officers returned to State Street, and Detective
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Arslanian notified Officer Bigelow that he had seen her get out of
the car in the vicinity of 1200 South State Street. R. 67.
Officer Bigelow was in an unmarked police vehicle, wearing
civilian clothes. R.70.

He pulled up to the defendant, stopped

his vehicle next to her on State Street, and asked the defendant
if she was dating. R.68.

The defendant opened the car door

herself, entered the car, and then said that yes, she was dating.
R. 68, 72.

She then asked if he was a cop. R. 68, 72.

Officer

Bigelow responded that he was not. R. 68.
At this point the defendant told the officer to show her his
"stuff". R. 68.
68.

In response, the officer took out some money. R.

The defendant's response was "No, what's between your legs."

R. 68.

The officer in turn asked her how he was supposed to know

if she was a cop. R. 68.

The defendant's response was to raise

her blouse and bra up and cupped her breast with one hand. R. 68.
She said "Let's do it together." R. 68.

Thus, the defendant was

offering to expose her breast to the officer if he would expose
himself to her. R.71.

The officer fiddled with his zipper. R.68.

He did not undo his zipper but pretended that he was ready to
expose himself. R.71.

The defendant said "Now" and neither she

nor the officer moved. R. 68.
The defendant then reached over with her free hand and groped
the officer's crotch. R. 68.

She said to the officer

you're not even unzipped yet." R.68.

"Well,

The officer realized that no

offer and agreement for sex would be forthcoming and arrested the
defendant

at that point

for disorderly

groping. R. 68.
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conduct based

on her

SUMMARY
I.

The

issue

OF THE

ARGUMENT

now presented

by

the

defendant

preserved at trial below for appellate review.

was

not

The Court of

Appeals should therefore not address the issue raised by defendant
and uphold her conviction.
II.

The

requirement.

defendant

has

not

satisfied

the

marshalling

The defendant has not presented all the evidence

nor shown in a light favorable to the verdict how that evidence
supports the verdict.

Without proper marshalling of the evidence,

the defendant's appeal should not be considered by the Court of
Appeals and the defendant's conviction affirmed.
III.

"Intent to obtain sexual stimulation or gratification"

is not an element of the offense.

The defendant asserts without

analysis or support that the phrase "apparent sexual stimulation
or gratification"

is an element of intent.

Where an issue is not

fully briefed, the Court of Appeals may and should disregard the
argument and affirm the decision below.

The phrase "an act of

apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" refers to conduct
having the appearance of sexual stimulation or gratification.
That phrase does not refer to the state of mind of the defendant.
IV.

Since "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" is

not an element of intent, the evidence was sufficient to prove
beyond

a

reasonable

doubt

"apparent

sexual

stimulation

or

gratification" as a substantive element of the ordinance.
V.

If, in the alternative, the Court of Appeals were to hold

the phrase was an element of intent, the evidence was sufficient
to prove

"apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" as an

5

intent

element

of

the

ordinance,

where

intent

is

properly

analyzed.
ARGUMENT

The

issue was not

POINT I.
preserved below

for appellate

review.

At trial, the defendant did not preserve the specific issue
now facing the Court of Appeals. As a result the Court of Appeals
should not now consider the issue.
objections in order

"Utah courts require specific

'to bring all claimed errors to the trial

court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the
errors if appropriate.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah
App. 1993) (quoting VanDvke v. Mountain Coin Mach. Distrib., Inc.,
758 P.2d 962, 964 (Utah App. 1988)).
The defendant failed to specifically argue at trial that the
intent element of the crime was not satisfied.

Therefore the

defendant failed to direct the trial court to the specific issue
with sufficient clarity so that the trial court would be given the
first opportunity to address the issue now ostensibly before the
appellate court - that the intent element had not been satisfied,
rather than the substantive conduct element.
requirement

arises

out

of

the

trial

court's

"This specificity
need

to

assess

allegations by isolating relevant facts and considering them in
the context of the specific legal doctrine placed at issue.

For

this reason, a general objection may be insufficient to preserve a
specific substantive issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d
at 361.
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The trial court was never made aware at trial that

the

defendant was asserting that the intent element of the offense had
not been satisfied.

"The

'mere mention' of an issue without

introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does
not preserve that issue for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at
361.

Indeed, the trial transcript reveals no suggestion that a

motion to dismiss was made at the conclusion of the prosecution's
case in chief. R. 72-73.
The trial court addressed

the issue of what

sexual conduct in its ruling. R. 83-84.
defendant

constitutes

However, nowhere did the

specifically raise the current

issue regarding

phrase "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification".
1

the

"In sum, '

[f]or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it

must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the
trial judge can consider it.' * " State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 361.
The trial court was not given the opportunity to address whether
the phrase "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" modified
the intent element of the ordinance.

Irrespective of whether the

phrase is considered an element of intent, the defendant did not
challenge at trial that the specific portion of the ordinance now
asserted on appeal was not proven.

The trial court was not given

the opportunity to address the issue of how this now disputed
phrase should be interpreted in light of the evidence presented.
As a general rule, appellate courts will
not
consider
an
issue,
including
a
constitutional argument, raised for the first
time on appeal unless the trial court
committed plain error or the case involves
exceptional circumstances.
The purpose of
requiring a properly presented objection is to
"put[] the judge on notice of the asserted
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error and allow [] the opportunity
for
correction at that time in the course of the
proceeding."
The trial court is considered
"the proper forum in which to commence
thoughtful and probing analysis" of issues.
Failing to argue an issue and present
pertinent evidence in that forum denies the
trial court "the opportunity to make any
findings of fact or conclusions of law"
pertinent to the claimed error.
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d at 359-60 (citations omitted).
A review of the trial transcript reveals no reference to a
motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the prosecution's case in
chief nor at the conclusion of all the evidence. Utah Rule of
Criminal

Procedure

17 (o) provides:

"At the conclusion of the

evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of all the
evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information
or indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the
evidence

is not

legally

sufficient

to establish

charged therein or any lesser included offense."

the

offense

The remarks made

by defendant's counsel during closing argument were not specific
enough to direct the trial court's attention to argument now
raised on appeal. R. 79-81.

Based on the defendant's failure to

preserve at trial the issue she now frames on appeal, the City
respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals not consider that
issue and affirm her conviction.

The defendant

POINT II,
has not satisfied

the

marshaling

requirement•
The

trial

judge

looked

at

all

circumstances of the whole." R. 84.

the

evidence

"the

That evidence included the

following facts not set forth by the defendant.
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under

The defendant was

known

to

the

police

prostitution. R. 67.

officers

to

have

prior

bookings

for

The area where the defendant was observed

and arrested was known to the officers to be "heavily worked by
prostitutes". R. 66.

The police officer was attempting to catch

the defendant in the act of soliciting or offering sex for hire.
R. 69.

The "common street verbal saying", rather than simply

"saying are [you] a prostitute", is to say "are you dating". R.
72.

The trial judge, sitting as finder of fact, ruled that he was

accepting the officer's testimony as to which version of events
took place. R. 82-83.

The trial judge further indicated a finding

that the defendant was there "on business" and that " [i]f the
officer had exposed himself as

[the defendant] requested

[the

defendant] would have gone further and the actual sexual act would
have been consumated." R. 83.
The defendant cites State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378,381 (Utah
App. 1992) for the following proposition:

"When raising the issue

of insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant is required to
marshal all the evidence in favor of the verdict." Appellant's
Brief at 6.

State v. Lemons further states:

To determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict, "we
view the evidence and the r e a s o n a b l e
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the verdict." We reverse only
when
the evidence, so viewed,
" 'is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.' "
In challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, the burden on the defendant is
heavy. Defendant " 'must marshal all evidence
supporting the jury's verdict and must then
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show
how
this
marshaled
evidence
is
insufficient to support the verdict even when
viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict.• "
State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381 (citations omitted)

(emphasis

added) .
The evidence referred to above, omitted by the defendant from
her brief, is important to the marshaling of the evidence because
that forms an important part of the context in which the offense
was committed.

The context of alleged prostitution activity forms

a key component of the factual background
disorderly conduct.

for the charge of

The officer's testimony, accepted by the

trial court, supports the reasonable inference that the conduct
described by the officer constituted a preliminary negotiation for
a sexual act.- the purpose of which would have been for the sexual
stimulation or gratification of the "John" had he not been in fact
an undercover police officer.

Both the evidence itself and the

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence are an
important part of the appellate analysis. When all the evidence is
taken into consideration and viewed in the light most favorable to
the

verdict,

the

evidence

here

is

neither

"sufficiently

inconclusive" nor "inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must

have

entertained

a

reasonable

doubt".

Based

on

the

defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the City respectfully
requests

that

the Court

of Appeals

invitation to address the issue.

10

decline

the

defendant's

Intent

to obtain
not

POINT III,
sexual stimulation
an element

or gratification

is

of the offense.

The defendant was charged with the offense of Disorderly
Conduct, a violation of Salt Lake City ordinance § 11-16-100.
elements associated with this charge are to "willfully
engage in sexual conduct, alone or with another person".

The

. . .

The term

"willfully" is the intent or mental state element required for the
offense (mens rea) .
the offense

"Sexual conduct" is the physical aspect of

(actus reus).

The definition of "sexual conduct"

includes "any touching of the covered or uncovered genitals, [or]
human female breast . . .whether alone or between members of the
same

or

opposite

sex

.

.

in

an

act

of

apparent

sexual

stimulation or gratification". Salt Lake City Code § 11-16-010(P),
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(7) (1953 as amended).
concedes

that her action of groping

The defendant

the officer's

crotch is

included in the definition of sexual conduct (Appellant's Brief at
4) .

The defendant centers her argument on the claim that

(1)

proof of intent to obtain sexual stimulation or gratification is a
required element of the offense

(Appellant's Brief at 4 ) , (2)

there was insufficient evidence to prove the groping was done with
the intent of obtaining sexual gratification (Appellant's Brief at
4 ) , and

(3) if not an element of intent, that it is an element

that must be proven and distinguished from non-sexual touching of
covered genitals (Appellant's Brief at 5 ) .
The defendant asserts without analysis, that the phrase "in
an act of apparent sexual gratification" is an element of intent.
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This is a mischaracterization of the element of "apparent sexual
gratification".

This assertion and mischaracterization is done

without argument or analysis as to why this phrase should be
considered an element of intent.

This is a failure to comply with

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(9):

"The argument

shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect

to

authorities,

the

issues

statutes,

(Emphasis added.)

presented,
and parts

with

of

the

citations
record

to

relied

the
on."

Where a claim is asserted without argument, the

Court of Appeals is under no obligation to provide the analysis
for the defendant, and may refuse to consider the claim. See State
v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992).

In Price, the Court of

Appeals held that the defendant had not complied with Rule 24: "We
agree with the State that defendant has not complied with Rule 24.
. . . .

Defendant failed to develop his claim either before the

trial court or in his appellate brief." State v. Price, 827 P.2d
at 249 (footnote omitted).

The Court of Appeals continued:

Defendant's brief on appeal does not
support defendant's contentions with citations
to the record and is devoid of legal analysis
on the issue . . . .
Utah's appellate courts
have voiced their frustration with briefs
which fail to comply with Rule 24.
We have routinely refused to consider
arguments which do not include a statement of
the facts properly supported by citations to
the record.
Utah courts have also declined to reach
the merits of an issue on appeal due to
inadequate legal analysis. In State v. Day,
815 P.2d 1345 (Utah App. 1991), the defendant
.neglected "to establish any of these
arguments
in the record
or by
legal
authority." Id. at 1351. We determined that
this failure rendered the defendant's argument
and analysis meaningless.
Therefore, we
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refused "to address this issue and assume[d]
the correctness
of the trial
court's
judgment." Id.
State v. Price, 827 P.2d at 249 (footnotes omitted).
The defendant states simply that the phrase "in an act of
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" is an element of
intent.

No argument is made for the proposition, and no authority

is cited in favor of it.
Court of Appeals refuse

The plaintiff would request that the
"to address the issue and assume the

correctness of the trial court's judgment" as it did in State v.
Price.
As set forth in Point I above, the defendant denied the trial
court the first opportunity to address the specific issue she now
raises on appeal.

The trial court addressed the nature of the

conduct committed by the defendant, not whether the requisite
intent for the offense required the defendant to have had a mind
set bent on obtaining sexual stimulation or gratification for
herself.

As set forth in Point I above, the City would request

the Court of Appeals not further consider the defendant's appeal
for this reason.
Should the Court proceed to consider the issue, the City
provides this

"in the alternative" analysis.

The element of

"apparent sexual gratification" does not address the mental state
of the defendant.

The mental state required by the ordinance is

"willfully". Salt Lake City Code § 11-16-100.

Proof of a culpable

mental state is a requirement of Utah law where strict liability
is not explicitly imposed. Utah Code Ann.§§
(1953 as amended) .

76-2-101,-102,-103

"Willfully" is synonymous with the terms
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"intentionally" or "with intent".

"A person engages in conduct:

(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1953 as amended).
The phrase the defendant claims modifies this element of
intent

is

"in

gratification" .

an

act

of

apparent

sexual

stimulation

or

There is no suggestion in the phrase that it

refers back to the mental state of the defendant.
The term "apparent" is not a defined term in either the Salt
Lake City Code or the Utah Code for the purpose here.

Standard

dictionary definitions of the term "apparent" are consistent.
From the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 62
(1969):

"1. Readily seen; open to view; visible.

understood or perceived; plain or obvious."

From Webster's New

Collegiate Dictionary 54 (1977): "1: open to view:
or manifest to the understanding
eye or mind

****••

2. Readily

VISIBLE

2: clear

3: appearing as actual to the

From Black's Law Dictionary 96

Edition 1990) (emphasis added):

(Sixth

"That which is obvious, evident,

or manifest; what appears, or has been made manifest.

That which

appears to the eye or mind; open to view; plain, patent."
Taking into account these standard definitions, the term
"apparent"

should

appearance of".
be

be

construed

to mean

"conduct

having

the

Thus the intended meaning of the provision would

"in an act having the appearance of sexual stimulation or

gratification".
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Utah Code § 76-10-1201 (included in the Appellant's Addendum
A) should be also noted for its impact on the meaning of the term
"apparent" in the City ordinance.

That section refers to "an act

of apparent or actual sexual stimulation or gratification." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1201

(Utah 1977).

The use in the state code

provision of the term "apparent or actual" reinforces the point
that this refers to the conduct itself and not the state of mind
of the offender.
The defendant has not fully briefed the issue, having failed
to present argument in support of the proposition that the phrase
"in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" is
actually an element of intent.

On that basis, the plaintiff

requests that the Court of Appeals decline to the consider the
issue framed by the defendant.
Further, the plain language of the ordinance does not support
the asserted interpretation of the defendant.

Therefore, "intent

to obtain" sexual stimulation or gratification is not an element
of the offense.

The operative element of intent was "willfully",

and under that standard the evidence was sufficient for the trial
court to conclude that the defendant had willfully engaged in "an
act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification".

As the

trial judge indicated: "When you look at the circumstances of the
whole, you have [the defendant] in the car sitting next to the
officer [with her] hand cuffed over [her] bare breast at the same
time fondling his genitals." R. 84.
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POINT IV,
The evidence was sufficient to prove "in an act of
apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" as an
element

of

the ordinance which did not modify

intent.

The defendant provides no alternative argument or analysis in
the event the Court of Appeals were to decide the phrase was not
an element of intent or to refuse to consider the issue.

The City

would again request the Court of Appeals to refuse to consider the
issue for the defendant's failure to fully brief the issue.
Irrespective of the above, the evidence was sufficient to
prove "an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification".
In considering the testimony presented as evidence, the trial
judge found that the police officer's testimony was more credible.
R.

82.

And

the

trial

court

found

that,

looking

at

"the

circumstances of the whole, you have [the defendant] in the car
sitting next to the officer [her] hand cuffed over her bare breast
at the same time fondling his genitals." R.84.

The "circumstances

of the whole" included testimony that the officer identified the
defendant as an individual with prior prostitution bookings (R.
67), in an area of known prostitution activity (R. 66), and that
the "are you dating" exchange and associated exposure of body
parts was a known component of the prostitution business (R. 68,
72) .
The evidence in this case was sufficient.

The

"clearly

erroneous" standard applies to appellate review of appeals from
bench trials claiming insufficiency of the evidence. State v.
Featherstone, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989).

Only where the trial

court's findings are " 'against the clear weight of the evidence,
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or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made' " will an appellate court
set aside the findings or verdict. Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 43132 (citation omitted).
regard

Further, an appellate court "must give due

to the opportunity

of

credibility of the witness.'

the

'trial court

to judge

the

" Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 432

(citation omitted).
The contextual background developed through the testimony at
trial

provides

committed

"an

support
act

gratification".

for

of

Further,

the

verdict

apparent
the

that

sexual

testimony

the

defendant

stimulation

indicated

that

or
the

defendant raised her own blouse and bra, covered her breast, and
indicated she would expose herself to the officer. R. 68.

It is a

reasonable inference and conclusion that an individual with one
hand over her naked breast and reaching over and groping someone's
crotch with the free hand can be considered to have committed an
act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.

And it is

that inference and conclusion that the trial court reached. R. 84.
The evidence was more than sufficient in this case to prove
"an act of sexual
court's

findings

stimulation or gratification".

do not go against

The

the clear weight

trial
of

the

evidence, and no mistake was made. Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 43132.
Considering all the evidence, and the reasonable inferences
therefrom, the evidence at trial was sufficient to uphold the
verdict, where the phrase "in an act of sexual stimulation or
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gratification" does not modify the element of intent. State v.
Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah 1992).
POINT V,
Even if "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification"
were to be considered an element of intent, the evidence
was sufficient to uphold the conviction.
The City submits the following argument in the alternative in
light of the City's position that this argument has not been
preserved for appeal nor marshaled appropriately on appeal, and
that the phrase is not an element of intent.

Even if "apparent

sexual stimulation or gratification" were to be considered an
element of intent, the evidence was sufficient

to uphold the

conviction.
If "apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" was to be
considered an element of intent, defendant has misstated

the

logical construction of the phrase as an element of intent.

The

term "obtain" set forth in the defendant's statement of the issue
is nowhere to be found in the ordinance or statute.
provided by the defendant.

It has been

The term"obtain" implies the attempt

by the defendant to obtain sexual stimulation or gratification for
herself.

The term

"provide" would be just as reasonable

addition.

Restating the defendant's statement of the issue:

an
Was

the evidence insufficient to prove the defendant's actions were
done with the intent to obtain and/or provide sexual gratification
or stimulation for oneself or to another?
Under this reasonable construction, the issue becomes whether
the conduct was done in an attempt to provide sexual stimulation
or gratification to a person other than the defendant.
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In this

instance,

that

other person

would

be

the undercover

police

officer, perceived by the defendant to be a potential customer.
The sexual stimulation or gratification intended by the defendant
here would have been that of the potential customer, not herself.
The defendant acknowledges that "[a] defendant's intent is
not easy to prove and there is rarely any direct evidence of
intent.

State

v.

Murphy,

Appellant's Brief at 5.

617

P.2d

399,

402

(Utah

1980)."

The defendant asserts that "the best way

to prove intent is by looking at what the defendant did and what
she said. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994); State
v. Canfield, 422 P.2d 196, 198 (Utah 1967)." Appellant's Brief at
5-6.

The trial court did exactly that.

In considering

the

testimony presented as evidence, the trial judge found that the
police officer's testimony was more credible. R. 82.

The trial

court found that, looking at "the circumstances of the whole, you
have [the defendant] in the car sitting next to the officer [her]
hand cuffed over her bare breast at the same time fondling his
genitals." R.84.
State v. Coolev.

State v. Kennedy. 616 P.2d 594 (Utah 1980), and
603 P. 2d 800

(Utah 1979) are cited without

analysis. Appellant's Brief at 6.

The City and the Court are left

to speculate how these address the issue.
The defendant asserts that her statement when groping him
"You're not even unzipped yet." somehow proves that there was no
attempt at sexual stimulation or gratification. R. 68, Appellant's
4

Brief

at

6.

Such an assertion

ignores

situation developed through testimony.

the context

of

the

The City submits that in

the context of the situation, preliminary negotiations for a sex
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act, all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom are
sufficient to uphold the verdict.
under

the evidence

that

It is a reasonable inference

the defendant

engaged

in an act of

apparent sexual stimulation or gratification in an attempt to
speed up the negotiation process or to encourage the conclusion of
a deal.
The evidence was more than sufficient in this case to prove
"an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" even if
the

phrase

"in

an

act

of

apparent

sexual

gratification" modified the element of intent..

stimulation

or

The trial court's

findings do not go against the clear weight of the evidence, and
no mistake was made. Featherstone, 781 P.2d at 431-32.
Considering all the evidence, and the reasonable inferences
therefrom, the evidence at trial was sufficient to uphold the
verdict, even if the phrase "in an act of sexual stimulation or
gratification" modified the element of intent. State v. Lemons,
844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah 1992).
CONCLUSION
The defendant failed to direct the trial court's attention to
the specific issue now before the Court of Appeals.

Where a

defendant fails to provide a trial court with the opportunity to
fully address the issue, the defendant is deemed to have waived
the issue for purposes of appeal.
The defendant has failed to marshal all the evidence in favor
of the verdict, and show how, considering that evidence in a light
most favorable to the verdict, the evidence fails to support the
verdict.

Where

a defendant

fails
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to properly

marshal

the

evidence, the Court of Appeals is under no obligation to further
review the defendant's claims.
There has been no analysis beyond mere assertion that the "in
an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification" element of
the offense is an element of intent.

The plain language of the

statute indicates that the phrase is not an element of intent.
The defendant again suggests that, if not an element of intent,
the phrase is nonetheless an element.
again provides no argument

However, the defendant

or analysis.

Where

there

is no

argument of an asserted issue, the Court of Appeals may properly
refuse to consider the issue.
The evidence at trial was sufficient to prove the requirement
of "in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification"
regardless of whether the phrase was considered an element of
intent or an element of physical activity.
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff and Appellee Salt Lake
City respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals affirm the
defendant * s conviction.
SUBMITTED this

l^Jffyy day of August, 1995.

T A." F I S H E R ^
Attorney for Appellee
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ADDENDA

23

unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a
whole clearly negates t h e presumed fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a
presumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge
t h a t while t h e presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, t h e
law regards t h e facts giving rise to t h e presumption as evidence of the presumed fact.
1973

Action

76-2-104.

Part 2
Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of
Another

76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by defendant.
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by
this code or other statutes shall be presented by the
defendant.
1*73

76-2-203.

PART 6

76-2-204.

DEFINITIONS

76-2-205.

76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement
and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, or a
facsimile or representation of the item, and:
(a) the actor's use or apparent intended
use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury; or
(b) the actor represents to the victim
verbally or in any other manner that he is in
control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal
statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when
there is a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" -means an individual, public or
private corporation, government, partnership, or
unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control over
tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death.
1969
CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Part 1
Culpability Generally
Section
76-2-101.
76-2-102.
76-2-103.

Requirements of criminal conduct and
criminal responsibility.
Culpable mental state required —
Strict liability.
Definitions of "intentionally, or with
intent or willfully"; "knowingly, or
with knowledge"; "recklessly, or

maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."
Conduct — When defined as offense.

76-2-201.
76-2-202.

Definitions.
Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of
another.
Defenses unavailable in prosecution
based on conduct of another.
Criminal responsibility of corporation
or association.
Criminal responsibility of person for
conduct in name of corporation or
association.
Part 3

Defenses to Criminal Responsibility
76-2-301.
76-2-302.
76-2-303.
76-2-304.
76-2-304.5.
76-2-305.

76-2-306.
76-2-307.
76-2-308.

Person under fourteen years old not
criminally responsible.
Compulsion.
Entrapment.
Ignorance or mistake of fact or law.
Mistake as to victim's age not a defense.
Mental illness — Use as a defense —
Influence of alcohol or other substance voluntarily consumed — Definition.
Voluntary intoxication.
Voluntary termination of efforts prior
to offense.
Affirmative defenses.
Part 4

Justification Excluding Criminal
Responsibility
76-2-401.^
76-2-402.
76-2-403.
76-2-404.
76-2-405.
76-2-406.

Justification as defense — When allowed.
Force in defense of person — Forcible
felony defined.
Force in arrest.
Peace officer's use of deadly force.
Force in defense of habitation.
Force in defense of property.

PART 1
CULPABILITY GENERALLY
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct
and criminal responsibility.
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct
is prohibited by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the offense
requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving
strict liability.
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not
apply to the violations set forth in Title 4 1 , Chapter
6, unless specifically provided by law.
1983

76-2-102. Culpable mental state required —
* Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental
state and the offense does not involve strict liability,
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any
culpable mental state.
1983
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with
intent or willfully"; "knowingly, or
with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or
criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain
to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care t h a t an ordinary person would exercise in
all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's
standpoint.
1974
76-2-104. Conduct — When defined as offense.
Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it with
criminal negligence. Conduct is also an offense if a
person engages in it intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly. Conduct is an offense if a person engages
in it recklessly, the conduct is an offense also if a
person engages in it intentionally or knowingly. Conduct is an offense if a person engages in it knowingly,
the conduct is an offense also if a person engages in it
intentionally.
1973
PART 2
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CONDUCT OF ANOTHER
76-2-201. Definitions.
As used in this part:

(1» "Agent" means any director, officer, employee, or other person authorized to act in behalf
of a corporation or association.
(2) "High managerial agent" means:
(a) A partner in a partnership;
lb) An officer of a corporation or association;
(c) An agent of a corporation or association who has duties of such responsibility
that his conduct reasonably may be assumed
to represent the policy of the corporation or
association.
(3» "Corporation" means all organizations required by the laws of this state or any other state
to obtain a certificate of authority, a certificate of
incorporation, or other form of registration to
transact business as a corporation within this
state or any other state and shall include domestic, foreign, profit and nonprofit corporations, but
shall not include a corporation sole, as such term
is used in Title 16, Chapter 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Lack of an appropriate certificate of
authority, incorporation, or other form of registration shall be no defense when such organization conducted its business in a m a n n e r as to
appear to have lawful corporate existence.
1973
76-2-202.

Criminal responsibility for direct com-

mission of offense or for conduct of another.
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly
commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.
1973

76-2-203. Defenses unavailable in prosecution
based on conduct of another.
In any prosecution in which an actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of another, it is
no defense:
(1) That the actor belongs to a class of persons
who by definition of the offense is legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual
capacity, or
(2) That the person for whose conduct the actor
is criminally responsible has been acquitted, has
not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a different type
or class of offense or is immune from prosecution.
1973

76-2-204. Criminal responsibility of corporation
or association.
A corporation or association is guilty of an offense
when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of
affirmative performance imposed on corporations
or associations by law; or
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by
the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent acting within the scope of his employment
and in behalf of the corporation or association.
1973

76-2-205. Criminal responsibility of person for
conduct in name of corporation or association.
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be

